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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF A STATE 
EMPLOYEE WHO INVOKES FIFTH AMENDMENT BEFORE A CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE-While employed as a social worker by the County of Los 
Angeles, Globe was subpoenaed to appear before a subcommittee of 
the House Un-American Activities Committee. California law imposed a 
duty on public employees to appear before certain tribunals and answer 
questions within specified categories, including an inquiry by a committee 
of the United States Congress as to past or present membership in the 
Communist Party.1 Failure to comply with the statute constituted in-
subordination, which would result in dismissal "in the manner provided 
by law." Because Globe had not yet acquired tenure, he was not 
entitled under civil service rules to a hearing as a condition to dis-
missal. When Globe refused to answer questions by invoking the First 
and Fifth Amendments, he was dismissed in accordance with the statu-
tory provisions. In an action for reinstatement, a superior court order 
in favor of the employee was reversed by the District Court of Appeal 
of California.2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
held, affirmed, three justices dissenting.s At least where a public em-
ployee is not seeking a hearing before his employer, the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits summary dismissal of that 
employee when he invokes the Fifth Amendment before a congressional 
committee in response to questions dealing with membership in the 
Communist Party. Nelson and Globe v. County of Los Angeles, 80 S. Ct. 
527 (1960).4 
Despite the misleading but widespread notion that public employ-
ment is a privilege but not a right,5 it is now quite clear that government 
employers cannot impose unreasonable or arbitrary conditions on public 
1 Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §1028.1. 
2163 Cal. App. (2d) 595, 329 P. (2d) 971 (1958). 
3 Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Douglas. Justice Black dissented in a sep-
arate opinion joined by Justice Douglas. Chief Justice Warren did not participate. 
4 In the case of Nelson, the dismissal of a permanent employee who refused to take 
advantage of a hearing to discuss invocation of the Fifth Amendment before a congressional 
committee was affirmed by an equally divided court. In accordance with Court custom, no 
opinions were rendered. 
5 One of the most frequently-cited sources of this approach is the famous statement of 
Judge Holmes that an individual "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he 
has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 
at 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
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employment.6 Within this context, most litigation in recent years has 
been prompted by the limitations imposed by governments as a reac-
tion to the threat of internal subversion. The courts have struggled to 
balance the legitimate public interest in self-preservation of our society 
with the traditional rights of the individual as secured by the Constitu-
tion. In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City,1 the 
Supreme Court invalidated the summary dismissal of a municipal college 
professor who invoked the Fifth Amendment before a Senate Internal 
Security subcommittee. The principal case highlights the widely-noted8 
failure of the Court in Slochower to identify with reasonable precision the 
specific feature of the dismissal proceedings which violated due process. 
In the principal case, Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court in both cases, purports to distinguish Slochower on the ground 
that the California statute provided for dismissal upon the "failure of 
the employee to answer" while the provision of the New York City Charter 
involved in Slochower was directed toward the "invocation of [a] consti-
tutional privilege."9 However, since the same act was committed in both 
cases, it would seem quite irrelevant that the California statute avoids 
direct reference to the Fifth Amendment but conceals the forbidden ac-
tion under the label "insubordination."10 Furthermore, the majority 
in the principal case read Slochower as involving a dismissal predicated 
on a "built-in" inference of guilt from invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.11 Although the Court in Slochower appeared to be reacting to 
the statements in the brief filed by New York City Corporation Counsel,12 
the entire record raised serious doubts whether impermissible inferences 
should have been decisive in determining the constitutionality of the 
dismissal proceedings.13 Thus the Court in the principal case has con-
cluded in effect that the due process defects of Slochower have been cured 
by comparative discretion in the preparation of the government brief and 
6Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of: Higher Education 
of New York City, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
7 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
s Note, 70 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 83 at 120 (1956); note, 30 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 346 (1957); 
McCloskey, "The Supreme Court Finds a Role: Civil Liberties in the 1955 Term," 42 VA. 
L. R.Ev. 735 at 749 (1956). 
11 Principal case at 531. But see 533, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). 
;10 See note 1 supra. 
11 Principal case at 531. 
12 The Board of Higher Education argued that one who invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment is either guilty of a crime or has committed perjury by stating that the answer would 
tend to be incriminating. Brief for Appellee, pp. 15, 20, Slochower v. Board of Higher 
Education of New York City, note 7 supra. 
1s The language of the statute authorizing dismissal does not lend itself directly to 
such inferences of guilt. New York City Charter §903, N.Y.C. CHARTER AND AD. CODE 
(1957). Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals expressly rejected such inferences in 
favor of the interpretation that dismissal for refusal to cooperate with such public tribu-
nals was a reasonable condition of public employment. Daniman v. Board of Education of 
City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532 at 538, 119 N. E. (2d) 373 at 377 (1954). 
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a careful omission of a direct reference to the Fifth Amendment in the 
dismissal statute. Surely to distinguish Slochower on these grounds is to 
sacrifice substance for form.14 In addition, the majority in the principal 
case rely on a line of authority which involves an important variation 
from the Slochower facts. In Garner v. Board of Public Works, the Court 
upheld a municipal ordinance which required as a prerequisite to con-
tinued public employment an affidavit of non-membership in organiza-
tions advocating overthrow of the government by force and an oath that 
the employee did not so advocate.15 Broadly interpreted, Garner au-
thorizes an investigation by the government employer into possible sub-
versive activities of an employee, which are considered as relevant to the 
fitness of that individual for public employment.1 6 This issue again came 
before the Court during the 1957 term when public employees were held 
to be properly dismissed upon failure to respond to questions of loyalty 
raised in a hearing by the government employer.17 It has been argued 
that failure of the employee to cooperate in providing information to 
which the government is clearly entitled under Garner is a reasonable 
basis for dismissal. In the principal case, Justice Clark argues that this 
line of authority is controlling because it is not determinative whether a 
federal or state tribunal performs the function.ls But such an approach 
is contrary to Slochower, where, in distinguishing Garner, emphasis was 
placed on the fact that the Senate subcommittee was limited to a broad 
consideration of national security problems for purposes of remedial 
legislation and not the evaluation of the qualifications of a particular 
person for public employment.19 
These surface distinctions between the principal case and Slochower 
tend to obscure a significant defect which is common to the dismissal 
proceedings employed in both cases. Certainly, the fundamental notion 
of procedural due process is that a person who is to be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property is entitled to timely notice and a fair hearing. In 
each case, summary dismissal resulted without any attempt to relate in-
vocation of the Fifth Amendment to the actual fitness of the individual 
14 However, in two previous decisions upholding dismissals of state employees, the 
Court had stressed that the state courts had found the ground for dismissal to be the re-
fusal, in itself, to answer questions concerning communist affiliations, and not disloyalty in-
ferred from invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 
399 at 406 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 at 475-476 (1958). See note, 57 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 412 (1959). 
15 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 
16 Principal case at 4160. 
17 Lerner v. Casey, note 14 supra; Beilan v. Board of Education, note 14 supra. 
18 Principal case at 531. Underlying the majority assumption is a possible double 
standard for review of the activities of a congressional committee. For purposes of the 
principal case, the House Un-American Activities Committee assumes the role of in-
terrogating a public employee as to his fitness for government employment while in Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), the same five justices rather generously attrib• 
uted a proper legislative purpose to the same House committee. 
19 See note 7 supra, at 553, 558. The distinction, adopted in Slochower, was reaffirmed 
in Lerner v. Casey, note 14 supra, at 477. 
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for public employment. Indeed, the majority opinion in Slochower care-
fully noted various explanations for uses of the Fifth Amendment which 
would not necessarily disqualify a person from public employment.20 
Since exercise of the right is an ambiguous act,21 the employee is entitled 
to explain or justify its use. Unfortunately, the petitioner appears to 
have stipulated that the issue of a hearing was not involved in the case.22 
In other words, the petitioner by relinquishing the only substantial pro-
tection afforded by Slochower appears to have placed himself in a posi-
tion analogous to the category of employees who have refused to co-
operate in loyalty investigations conducted by their employer. In that 
sense, the majority's reference to the recent cases which upheld dismissals 
of such uncooperative employees seems appropriate.23 However, even 
though the result in the principal case might be consistent with Slochower, 
the tangle of reasoning based upon technical distinctions jeopardizes the 
Slochower holding, and one may ask whether the Court will rely on similar 
distinctions to avoid the requirement of a hearing if and when the pro-
cedural due process issue is raised under a California-type statute. 
John L. Peschel 
20 See note 7 supra, at 558. 
21 The proper use of the Fifth Amendment by an innocent person who fears prosecu-
tion but may not be able to marshal the evidence to prove his innocence should not be 
overlooked, particularly when the right has always been available in federal proceedings 
to the worst criminal. For a further development of this notion, see GruswoLD, TIIE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TODAY 14-22 (1955). 
22 Principal case at 531, n. 5, 535. Compare Brief for Appellant, pp. 21, 22, Slochower 
v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, note 7 supra. · 
23 See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
